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Abstract 
As the title suggests, this paper argues that evidence of intoxication 
should be inadmissible for all offences, including murder. Such an 
argument is justified on public policy grounds, and by the proposition 
that principles of criminal law relating to voluntariness and intention 
should be secondary to the morally correct position that a person who 
is voluntarily intoxicated is criminally responsible for any conduct he 
or she causes whilst in such a condition. As an alternative to such an 
‘absolutist’ position, this paper contends that it is appropriate to place 
a legal burden on the defence where intoxication is raised to rebut the 
presumption that the intoxicated person foresaw or intended the 
natural and probable consequences of his or her conduct. The analysis 
is conducted through the relevant intoxication provisions in the 
Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) and the Criminal Code 1983 (NT). The 
argument is made that these two Codes have the weakest and least 
effective version of the Majewski principle of all Australian 
jurisdictions such that the relevant basic intent provisions make the 
prohibition virtually meaningless. Revised provisions dealing with 
intoxication have been proposed for s 43AS Criminal Code 1983 
(NT). The overriding objective of these redrafted provisions is to 
strengthen the reach of s 43AS, and to make these provisions the 
strongest and most effective version of the Majewski principle in 
Australia. 
I INTRODUCTION 
He that kills a man when he is drunk shall be hanged when he is sober.1 
This paper will critically examine the role of intoxication (a term 
which for present purposes encompasses alcohol and drugs) in 
determining criminal liability in Australia. It is possible to divide 
Australian jurisdictions into two groups for the purpose of classifying 
the treatment of evidence of intoxication: those that follow The 
Queen v O’Connor2 and those that adhere to DPP v Majewski.3 In 
                                                           
!  Lecturer in Law, University of Southern Queensland. 
1  Rosalind Fergusson, The Penguin Dictionary of Proverbs (Penguin, 1983) 51. 
2  (1980) 146 CLR 64. Victoria and South Australia follow the O’Connor principle. 
2 The University of Tasmania Law Review Vol 29 No 1 2010 
 
O’Connor, the High Court decided by a majority of four to three that 
evidence of intoxication was part of the totality of the evidence in 
determining whether the Crown had proved beyond reasonable doubt 
that the defendant had acted voluntarily and intentionally. By 
contrast, in Majewski, the House of Lords held that offences should 
be divided into specific and basic intent,4 with evidence of intoxication 
only being relevant to an offence of specific intent.5 This decision was 
rooted in a public policy principle that if a person voluntarily 
consumes alcohol then it is justifiable to hold that person criminally 
responsible for any injury caused whilst intoxicated. As will be 
discussed in the body of the paper, considerable criticism has been 
directed at the arbitrariness and difficulties in dividing offences 
between specific and basic intent. 
This paper will avoid problems surrounding such a distinction by 
contending for the radical proposition that evidence of voluntary 
intoxication should be excluded from a determination of voluntariness 
and intention for all offences, including murder.6 Section 43AF(5) 
Criminal Code 1983 (NT) states that ‘evidence of self-induced 
intoxication cannot be considered in determining whether conduct is 
voluntary’.7 The focus of this paper is to advocate a similar absolute 
exclusion for self-induced intoxication and intention, or, in the 
alternative, to take the position that the defence must discharge a legal 
burden on the balance of probabilities that the defendant did not 
foresee or intend the natural and probable consequences of his or her 
                                                                                                                               
3  [1977] AC 443 (House of Lords). See Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 28(3); Criminal 
Code 1902 (WA) s 28(3); Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) s 17(2); Criminal Code 2002 
(ACT) s 31; Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) s 8.2; Criminal Code 1983 (NT) s 43AS; 
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 428C. For the import of such a distinction see G.F. 
Orchard, ‘Criminal Responsibility and Intoxication — The Australian Rejection of 
Majewski’ (1980) New Zealand Law Journal 532, 533: ‘Where an offence requires 
a specific intent the accused is entitled to acquittal if he lacked the required intent, 
even though this resulted from the effects of voluntary intoxication.’ 
4  An offence of basic intent is one where the defendant intends to commit the 
proscribed conduct such as to strike the victim in a case of common assault. For an 
offence of specific intent some further intention is required such as not only 
intending to strike the victim but also intending to cause the victim serious harm 
in a case of causing serious harm.  
5  Ja v Goldsmith [2004] ACTSC 15 (2 September 2004) [15] (Crispin J). Crispin J 
was construing s 31 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) in relation to grievous bodily 
harm and concluded that ‘this provision does not apply to an allegation of a 
specific intent such as an intent to cause grievous bodily harm [and] hence, the 
appellant’s state of intoxication had to be taken into account’. 
6  ‘In early Anglo-Saxon law, no concession was made in practice to an intoxicated 
accused.’ S Bronitt and B McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (Thomson 
Reuters, 2005) 242, citing R U Singh, ‘History of the Defence of Drunkenness in 
English Criminal Law’ (1933) 49 Law Quarterly Review 528, 529. 
7  See also Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) s 4.2(6); Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) s 15(5); 
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 428G(1). 
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conduct because this is peculiarly within the knowledge of the 
defendant. 
Chief Justice Barwick in O’Connor asked the question whether 
‘intoxicated violence’ was sufficient to warrant a departure from 
established common law principles.8 This paper unequivocally 
answers that question in the affirmative, and supports the view of the 
minority in O’Connor that a defendant who chooses to become 
intoxicated is morally accountable for any offences committed while 
in that state.9 However, it is here further argued that there is no 
reason of public policy to distinguish between offences of specific and 
basic intent, and that evidence of intoxication should be inadmissible 
in all criminal trials.  
The justification for extending the Majewski approach to all offences 
is grounded in the very significant statistical relationship between 
alcohol consumption and homicide in Australia. In a recent study, 
Dearden and Payne concluded that 47 per cent of all homicides 
recorded between 1 July 2000 and 30 June 2006 were classified as 
alcohol related.10 Furthermore, estimates suggest that in 2004-05, the 
total costs attributable to alcohol-related crime in Australia was $1.7 
billion with the social cost relating to alcohol-related violence 
(excluding the costs to the criminal justice system) calculated to be 
$187 million, while the costs associated with the loss of life due to 
alcohol-related violent crime amounted to $124 million.11  
A suitable public information campaign prior to the introduction of 
legislation banishing evidence of intoxication would ensure that 
potential intoxicated defendants would not be able to claim ignorance 
of a change in the law. Such a campaign would reinforce the positive 
duty on any state to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of 
those within its jurisdiction and a duty to put in place ‘effective 
criminal law provisions to deter the commission of offences against 
the person backed up by law enforcement machinery for the 
prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such 
provisions’.12 
                                                           
8  (1980) 146 CLR 64, 86. 
9  The Queen v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64, 94 (Gibbs J), 109-110 (Mason J), 136 
(Wilson J). 
10  Jack Dearden and Jason Payne, ‘Alcohol and Homicide in Australia’ (Trends and 
Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No 372, Australian Institute of Criminology, 
2009) 5. 
11  Anthony Morgan and Amanda McAtamney, ‘Key Issues in Alcohol-Related 
Violence’ (Research in Practice Summary Paper, No 04, Australian Institute of 
Criminology, 2009) 1. 
12  Osman v United Kingdom (1998) App No 23452/94 [115], cited in the Law 
Commission of England and Wales, ‘Intoxication and Criminal Liability’, Law 
Com No 314 (2009) 3.67. 
4 The University of Tasmania Law Review Vol 29 No 1 2010 
 
In the event that such a position is considered too extreme, this paper 
contends that as a second best solution, for the purpose of reversing 
the onus of proof in relation to evidence of intoxication, it is 
appropriate to adopt the rebuttable presumption that every person 
intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts. In 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith,13 the House of Lords 
adopted the objective test of the reasonable person as opposed to the 
subjective test of the defendant’s intention. The objective test in 
Smith was rejected by the High Court in Parker v The Queen.14  
Where a subjective test is applied, the Crown must prove that the 
accused had the requisite state of mind at the time he or she carried 
out the external element. However, this is ‘somewhat artificial as an 
accused, in many cases, will deny that he or she possessed the 
necessary state of mind necessary to commit the offence’.15 Barwick 
CJ in Pemble v R pointed out that the jury will normally have to infer 
the accused’s state of mind from what the accused has actually done 
and the surrounding circumstances. 
The state of mind of the accused is rarely so exhibited as to enable it to be 
directly observed. Its reckless quality if that quality relevantly exists must 
almost invariably be a matter of inference. Although what the jury think a 
reasonable man might have foreseen is a legitimate step in reasoning 
towards a conclusion as to the accused's actual state of mind, a firm 
emphasis on the latter as the fact to be found by the jury is necessary to 
ensure that they do not make the mistake of treating what they think a 
reasonable man's reaction would be in the circumstances as decisive of the 
accused's state of mind… that conclusion [as to the accused's state of 
mind] could only be founded on inference, including a consideration of 
what a reasonable man might or ought to have foreseen.16 
Applying the above comments on inference in relation to a subjective 
test as to the accused’s actual state of mind, it is here argued that if the 
defence introduces intoxication as evidence as to why the defendant 
did not have the requisite state of mind then the defence must 
overcome an objective test that every person intends the natural and 
probable consequences of his or her acts. Thus, the ‘artificiality’ of the 
subjective test where the jury is required to infer the defendant’s state 
of mind, is replaced, when intoxication is raised, by a clearer objective 
test as to what a reasonable sober person might have intended or 
foreseen. In this way, the double-edged sword that evidence of 
intoxication currently represents would become singularly single-
edged.  
                                                           
13  Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1961] AC 290 (House of Lords) 
(‘Smith’). 
14   (1963) 111 CLR 610, 632 (Dixon CJ). 
15  Jonathan Clough and Carmel Mulhern, Criminal Law (Butterworths, 2004) 17. 
16  Pemble v R (1971) 124 CLR 107, 120-121 (Barwick CJ). See also R v Clare (1993) 
72 A Crim R 357, 369; and R v Cutter (1997) 94 A Crim R 152, 156-157, 164-166. 
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For the purpose of analysis, the approach taken in this paper is to 
examine the Criminal Code 1983 (NT) which recently adopted 
Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) as a new Part IIAA.17 In 
particular, attention will be focused on s 43AS Intoxication — offences 
involving basic intent, which is closely modelled on s 8.2 Criminal 
Code 1995 (Cth). Essentially, both of these Codes have opted for the 
Majewski model of distinguishing between offences of specific and 
basic intent. However, the Commonwealth Criminal Code’s Guide to 
Practitioners states that ‘specific intent has no counterpart in Chapter 
2 and basic intent is given a restricted definition’ such that Majewski 
is ‘of little or no use in determining the application of the Code 
provisions’.18 
Section 43AS(1) Criminal Code 1983 (NT) states that evidence of 
self-induced intoxication cannot be considered in determining 
whether a fault element of basic intent existed. However, s 43AS(1) is 
qualified by a note that states that ‘a fault element of intention in 
relation to a result or circumstance is not a fault element of basic 
intent’, and by subsections which allow self-induced intoxication to be 
taken into consideration in determining whether the conduct was 
accidental (s 43AS(2)) or whether the person had a mistaken belief 
about facts (s 43AS(3)). As Odgers has pointed out, the prohibition on 
the use of evidence of voluntary intoxication has no application in 
determining whether a fault element existed in relation to ‘a physical 
element of circumstance or a physical element of result; an ulterior (or 
specific) intention; or knowledge, recklessness or negligence’.19 It will 
be contended that the note and the two exceptions have the effect of 
making the prohibition in s 43 AS(1) virtually meaningless. 
This paper will address the vexed question of intoxication and 
criminal responsibility at three levels. Firstly, it is proposed to extend 
the Majewski model to cover all offences. Secondly, in the alternative, 
it is argued that where intoxication evidence is raised, the rebuttable 
presumption relating to foresight and intention of the natural and 
probable consequences of actions should be introduced. Thirdly, a 
revised s 43AS is proposed containing the general rule that where 
recklessness is the fault element evidence of intoxication is 
inadmissible, such that it has a more wide-reaching effect on offences 
of basic intent. The proposed s 43AS will in turn be supplemented by 
a subsection giving a short list of offences of specific intent in order to 
avoid confusion as to which offences are covered by the prohibition.20 
                                                           
17  Criminal Code Amendment (Criminal Responsibility Reform) Act 2005 (NT). 
18 Ian Leader-Elliott for the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, The 
Commonwealth Criminal Code — A Guide for Practitioners (2002) 145. 
19  Stephen Odgers, Principles of Federal Criminal Law, (2007) 70.  
20  See for example Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 428B. 
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II BACKGROUND 
Looking at this great social defect of drunkenness, Australians are not 
content to drink, or even to get drunk – they never drop the cup until 
delirium-tremens overtakes them.21 
The architect of the Criminal Code 1983 (NT), Mr Sturgess, in his 
preface to the Criminal Code discussed the treatment of intoxication. 
Having referred to the Northern Territory government’s policy that a 
defence based upon voluntary intoxication was to be regarded as an 
excuse of little merit, Mr Sturgess continued: 
In giving effect to this policy the following matters have been provided 
for: involuntary intoxication has been given a strict definition (section 1); 
until the contrary is proved it is to be presumed that intoxication was 
voluntary and, unless it was involuntary, that the accused person foresaw 
the natural and probable consequences of his conduct and intended them 
(section 7); that voluntary intoxication is only relevant in relation to 
penalty when doing a dangerous act is charged and, in most cases, will 
increase the penalty (section 154).22 
As it transpired, part of this policy fell foul of the Federal 
Government and s 7 proved to be the first section of the newly 
minted Criminal Code 1983 (NT) to be amended.23 As originally 
worded, s 7 did not contain the word ‘evidentially’ and established a 
legal presumption (‘until the contrary is proved’) that, in any case 
where ‘intoxication may be regarded for the purposes of determining 
whether a person is guilty or not guilty of an offence’, the accused 
‘foresaw the natural and probable consequences of his conduct and 
intended them’. In response to a question as to whether the onus of 
proof had been reversed under s 7, Mr Sturgess replied as follows at a 
seminar on the Criminal Code held shortly after the Code had been 
passed by the Northern Territory in October 1983: ‘No, you are 
talking about an inference here. An inference may be drawn in the 
circumstances that you intended what you actually did, and Lionel 
Murphy says that is the law — it always was the law — you are 
presumed to have intended what you did.’24 
The above reference was to Murphy J’s judgment in O’Connor v The 
Queen: 
Perhaps no harm will be done if the (rebuttable) presumption continues to 
be used, even if it is described as a process of inference. It is important in 
cases where there is evidence of intoxication that the tribunal understand 
                                                           
21  Frank Fowler, Southern Lights and Shadows (Sampson Low, 1859), 47-48.  
22  D G Sturgess, Preface to the Criminal Code, 12 August 1983, 8. 
23  Criminal Code Amendment Act 1984 (NT). 
24  Comments by D G Sturgess, Criminal Code Seminar Transcript, October 1983, 
Darwin, 119. 
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that, consistently with the presumption of innocence, an inference is 
available to it that a person intends the natural and probable consequences 
of his actions. In the absence of other evidence, this is the only reasonable 
inference open to them in most criminal cases.25  
This presumption of foreseeing the natural and probable 
consequences of conduct was criticised shortly after the Criminal 
Code 1983 (NT) had been passed in November 1983 by the then 
Prime Minister as placing an ‘insuperable burden on a defendant’ and 
as a breach of Article 14 (the presumption of innocence) of the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights scheduled to the 
Human Rights Commission Act 1981 (Cth).26 The fledgling 
Northern Territory Government immediately accepted the Prime 
Minister’s criticism under the threat of s 122 of the Federal 
Constitution.27 
The effect of the amendment was to change the presumption from a 
legal burden to an evidential one, such that the defendant must 
adduce evidence of intoxication but the burden of proving intention 
or recklessness remains on the prosecution.28 This interpretation of 
the amended s 7(1)(b) was confirmed by the Supreme Court of the 
Northern Territory in Charlie v The Queen where two judges of the 
Court of Appeal spoke of s 7(1)(b) establishing an evidential burden 
only.29 
Nevertheless, Bronitt and McSherry consider s 7(1)(b) to be 
‘somewhat different to the other jurisdictions in that it does not 
expressly state that intoxication may negate the fault element of a 
crime’ and that its wording ‘seems to suggest that self-induced 
intoxication will be irrelevant to the question of intention’.30 
Ironically, because the new Part IIAA (effectively Chapter 2 of the 
                                                           
25  (1980) 146 CLR 64, 116. 
26  Letter dated 17 November 1983 written by the Prime Minister, the Honourable 
Robert Hawke to the Chief Minister of the Northern Territory cited in 
Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee, Criminal Liability for Self-
Induced Intoxication, Report Number 53 (1999) 49. 
27  Section 122 of the Federal Constitution is entitled ‘Government of territories’ 
which gives the Federal Parliament the power to make laws for the government of 
any territory. Action under the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 
(Cth) s 9 was proposed. See (1984) 9 Commonwealth Record 472, recording the 
agreement between the Commonwealth and Northern Territory Attorney-
General for amendments to the Code, cited in Australian Law Reform 
Commission, Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law, Report No 31 (1986) 
[439]. 
28  Criminal Code Amendment Act 1984 (NT), s 7(1)(b): ‘unless the intoxication was 
involuntary, it shall be presumed evidentially that the accused person foresaw the 
natural and probable consequences of his conduct.’ 
29  (1998) 7 NTLR 152, 157 (Martin CJ), 170-171 (Angel J).  
30  Bronitt and McSherry, above n 6, 249.  
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Criminal Code (Cth)) only applies to a narrow band of offences in 
Part VI which covers offences against the person,31 s 7(1)(b) remains 
the relevant section dealing with intoxication for all other offences 
including causing serious harm and causing harm. This paper 
contends that even the amended s 7(1)(b) is more effective than its 
equivalent section, s 43AS, in Part IIAA, notwithstanding the partial 
adoption of the Majewski principles because the omission from the 
reach of s 43AS of a fault element of intention for a physical element 
of a result or circumstance, and the accident and mistake of fact 
exceptions, severely limit the effect of s 43AS in excluding evidence of 
intoxication for offences of basic intent. 
III DECONSTRUCTING INTOXICATION IN PART IIAA 
CRIMINAL CODE (NT) 
At other times he was so overwhelmed by a desire for strong drink that 
not even the spirits in his instruments were safe in his presence.32 
A Voluntariness 
The incorporation of Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) as 
Part IIAA of the Criminal Code 1983 (NT) brought two sections into 
play for the purposes of the treatment of evidence of intoxication. 
The first is s 43AF which deals with voluntariness (s 4.2 in the 
Criminal Code 1995 (Cth)), and the second is s 43 AS which covers 
intoxication. Section 43AF(1) states that conduct can only be a 
physical element33 if it is voluntary, and s 43AF(2) explains that 
conduct is only voluntary if it is the product of the will of the person 
whose conduct it is. By way of clarification, examples of conduct 
which is not voluntary are given such as a spasm, convulsion or other 
unwilled bodily movement; an act performed during sleep or 
unconsciousness; and an act performed during impaired consciousness 
depriving the person of the will to act. These two subsections set out 
well settled legal territory on voluntariness and specifically import 
automatism into the Criminal Code 1983 (NT). 
For present purposes, it is s 43AF(5) which moves to centre stage. 
Section 43AF(5) states that evidence of self-induced intoxication 
                                                           
31  Part IIAA applies to all offences listed in Schedule 1. 
32  Manning Clark, A History of Australia (Melbourne University Press, vol 4, 1978) 
145 of John McDouall Stewart. 
33  Under s 43AC which deals with establishing guilt of offences a person must not be 
found guilty of committing an offence unless the existence of the physical elements 
of the offence and for each physical element one of the fault elements (where 
required) for the physical element is proved. 
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cannot be considered in determining whether conduct is voluntary. 
Section 43AD(1) defines conduct as an act, an omission to perform an 
act or a state of affairs, while 43AE sets out that a physical element of 
an offence may be conduct, or a result of conduct, or a circumstance 
in which conduct, or a result of conduct, happens. Thus, clearly, the 
effect of s 43AF(5) above is to exclude evidence of self-induced 
intoxication from the physical element of an offence (or the actus 
reus). As Odgers has pointed out: 
If the only evidence tending to suggest that a person’s conduct was not the 
product of the person’s will is evidence the person was intoxicated, and 
the intoxication was self-induced, such evidence must be disregarded by 
the tribunal of fact. If it must be disregarded then, presumably, the 
inference of voluntariness will be drawn.34 
It is illuminating to consider the ramifications of s 43AF(5) in the 
context of the well known passage from Barwick CJ’s judgment in 
The Queen v O’Connor: 
But the state of intoxication may, though perhaps only rarely, divorce the 
will from the movements of the body so that they are truly involuntary. 
Or, again, and perhaps more frequently, the state of intoxication, whilst 
not being so complete as to preclude the exercise of the will, is sufficient 
to prevent the formation of an intent to do the physical act involved in the 
crime charged.35 
If one conceives of these two states of intoxication on a scale of 0 to 
10, where 0 is stone cold sober and 10 is paralytic, then 7.5 could 
represent a person being sufficiently intoxicated to prevent the 
formation of an intent to do the physical act which goes to the fault 
element or mens rea. Then again, 9 could represent a person who is 
so intoxicated that the will has been divorced from the movements of 
the body which goes to the physical element or actus reus. It is this 
second or super intoxicated state that s 43 AF(5) has knocked out 
from the evidential equation. However, for crimes of specific intent 
the O’Connor principle of intoxication being part of the totality of 
the evidence is alive and well for the first intoxicated state relating to 
the fault element of intention. 
The mechanics of evidence of intoxication being excluded for 
voluntariness and included for intention under Part IIAA can be 
illustrated for the specific intent offence of murder. 
Section 156 Murder 
(1) A person is guilty of the crime of murder if: 
(a) the person engages in conduct; and 
                                                           
34  See above n 19, 27. 
35  (1980) 146 CLR 64, 72. 
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(b) that conduct causes the death of another person; and 
(c) the person intends to cause the death of, or serious harm 
to, that or any other person by that conduct.  
The elements of s 156(1) can be broken down as follows: 
1. The person engages in conduct 
• Physical element — Conduct 
• Fault element — Intention (s 43AM(1)36 default fault element) 
2. That element causes the death of another person 
• Physical element — Result 
• Fault element — Intention to cause the death of, or serious 
harm to, that or any other person by the conduct. 
Consequently, it can be seen that s 43AF(5) means that evidence of 
intoxication cannot be considered for the physical element of conduct 
as per s 156(1)(a) above where the person engages in conduct. The 
requirement of voluntariness applies only to conduct. By contrast, 
evidence of intoxication is able to be considered as to whether the 
person intended the result of that conduct as per s 156(1)(c) above. 
A recent Northern Territory example of the consideration of evidence 
of intoxication in a murder trial under Part IIAA occurred in The 
Queen v Billy King37 In this case, the defendant stabbed the victim 
nine times with a 23 centimetre knife with the final fatal wound being 
between the breasts while she was prone on the Katherine Terrace 
median strip in broad daylight in view of a number of witnesses. The 
defendant had also stabbed a bystander who had tried to intervene. 
This was a case of a virtual certainty that after eight previous attempts 
the final ninth stab wound directed between the breasts would prove 
fatal. 
The only issue at the trial was the defendant’s intention as he was 
heavily intoxicated at the time of the killing. The jury returned a 
verdict of manslaughter as presumably they were not satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt that the defendant intended either to kill the 
deceased or cause her serious (grievous) harm. This verdict was 
available because the O’Connor principle is the law in all jurisdictions 
in Australia for crimes of specific intent such as murder, and 
                                                           
36  S 43AM(1) states: ‘If a law that creates an offence does not provide a fault element 
for a physical element that consists only of conduct, intention is the fault element 
for the physical element.’ By contrast, s 43AM(2) states: ‘If a law that creates an 
offence does not provide a fault element for a physical element that consists only 
of a result or circumstance, recklessness is the fault element for the physical 
element.’ There is a note for s 43AM(2) which states: ‘Under section 43AK(4), 
recklessness can be established by proving intention, knowledge or recklessness.’ 
37  The Queen v Billy King, (Unreported, Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, 
Angel ACJ, 4 July 2008). 
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presumably the jury’s verdict represents an exception to evidence 
presented to the Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee ‘that 
the O’Connor argument is not very often used and, when it is argued, 
it is very rarely accepted’.38  
Proponents of the O’Connor principle argue that the exclusion of 
evidence of self-induced intoxication means that the defendant’s 
ability to act voluntarily and intentionally would be evaluated 
hypothetically and would be based on a legal fiction. A former 
Victorian Director of Public Prosecutions has expressed the view that 
allowing evidence of voluntary intoxication to be taken into account 
can actually assist the Crown: 
From our perspective, we are quite happy to live with the intoxication as a 
fact that the jury can take into account along with all the other facts 
because we find that, as a matter of reality, intoxication is two-edged. 
Once it is raised it also raises very clearly the fact that it reduces a 
person’s inhibitions. It makes people less likely to have the same self-
control that they might when sober; and it might explain to a jury why 
someone might do something that otherwise would be quite out of 
character.39 
By contrast, this paper disputes the above view that evidence of 
intoxication may be counter-productive for the defence, instead 
contending that the outcome in The Queen v Billy King is 
unsatisfactory and that public policy mandates that either Majewski 
apply to all offences or such a defendant is properly required to 
discharge a legal burden on the balance of probabilities that he or she 
did not foresee or intend the natural and probable consequences of his 
or her conduct. In effect, the latter is a call to restore the equivalent 
language of the repealed s 7 Intoxication, Criminal Code 1983 (NT). 
Support for this proposition can be found in Canada where the 
‘Canadian Supreme Court has often found that a persuasive burden of 
proof can be held constitutional as a demonstrably justified reasonable 
limit under section 1,40 as the Court has decided for defences of 
                                                           
38  Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee, Criminal Liability for Self-
Induced Intoxication, Report Number 53 (1999) 107. 
39  Ibid, 110, citing a submission from Mr G Flatman, QC, the then Victorian 
Director of Public Prosecutions. See also Leader-Elliott, above n 18, 135: ‘The 
potential benefits to the prosecution from attempts to base a defence or denial of 
liability on evidence of intoxication are frequently remarked.’ See, for example: 
Ainsworth (1994) 76 A Crim R 127, 138-139 (Gleeson CJ).’  
40  Section 1 reads: ‘The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the 
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed 
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.’ Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act 1982 (Canada), 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) c.11, s 1. 
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mental disorder, extreme intoxication and, very recently,41 sane 
automatism’.42 
B The Absolutist Approach 
It is important to clarify the crux of the argument of this paper. This 
is a call for an ‘absolutist’ approach which would never permit a 
defendant to rely on voluntary intoxication to avoid criminal liability 
where the defendant’s intoxicated understanding of the circumstances 
would always be replaced by the view the defendant would have taken 
if he or she had been sober. The Law Commission of England and 
Wales levelled the following criticism at such an ‘absolutist’ approach: 
An ‘absolutist’ approach of this kind, which would focus solely on D’s 
conduct and its effects, but would disregard D’s state of mind where 
affected by voluntary intoxication, might contribute in some small way to 
the reduction of the social evil of drink or drug-fuelled violent crime and 
reassure the public. However, it could result in D being convicted of 
offences such as murder when D’s culpability came nowhere close to the 
requirements for legal liability. To permit such a degree of mismatch 
between the level of culpability and the level of the offence committed 
would be wrong.43 
The Law Commission gave as an example a defendant genuinely 
believing that he was stabbing a mannequin when actually stabbing a 
friend, and that the ‘absolutist’ position would attribute to the 
defendant a non-existent intention to kill or seriously harm another 
person. The Law Commission suggested that such an ‘absolutist’ 
approach would ‘equate the moral culpability associated with self-
induced intoxication to the moral culpability required for any crime, 
even murder’ and concluded that ‘such a disproportion between 
culpability and the extent of liability cannot be introduced into the 
criminal law’.44 
Support for the ‘absolutist’ position can be found in various 
submissions to the Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee, 
including one from the Queensland Director of Public 
Prosecutions,45 and an example of this view was expressed by Mr Ray 
Pinkerton that ‘people know what alcohol does and if they become 
self-intoxicated, then they should have to answer fully for every crime 
                                                           
41  See The Queen v Stone [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290. 
42 Don Stuart, ‘Supporting General Principles for Criminal Responsibility in the 
Model Penal Code with Suggestions for Reconsideration: A Canadian Perspective’ 
(2000) 4(13) Buffalo Criminal Law Review 40. 
43  The Law Commission of England and Wales, Intoxication and Criminal Liability, 
Law Com No 314 (2009) 1.56. 
44  Ibid, 1.57. 
45  See Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee, above n 38, 104, citing inter 
alia Mr R Miller, QC, the then Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld). 
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or misdemeanour that they commit’.46 Historically, this has been the 
law as exampled by the sixteenth century case of Reniger v Feogossa47 
which in turn draws on the ethics of Aristotle48 and moral 
responsibility. Coke states that: ‘As for the drunkard who is 
voluntarius daemon, he hath no privilege thereby, but what he hurt or 
ill soever he doeth, his drunkenness doth aggravate it’.49 Implicit in 
the ‘absolutist’ approach advocated in this paper is that, for the 
purpose of defining the relationship between alcoholism and criminal 
liability, alcoholism should not be treated as a disease but as a habit 
and therefore relevant only to sentencing rather than to criminal 
defences.50 
Significantly, the background to the above Parliament of Victoria 
Inquiry was the case of Noa Nadruku who punched two women in the 
face but was acquitted by Magistrate Madden on the grounds that ‘the 
degree of intoxication is so overwhelming to the extent that the 
defendant, in my view, did not know what he did and did not form 
any intent as to what he was doing’.51 A Committee of the Legislative 
Assembly for the Australian Capital Territory noted that ‘the ACT 
magistrate’s decision attracted widespread community outrage, both 
in the ACT and nationally’ prompting calls for legislative reform ‘to 
prevent a defendant being able to rely on the “defence” of excessive 
intoxication to avoid criminal responsibility’.52 
Further evidence of public disquiet can be found in the public furore 
surrounding acquittals for killings that have resulted from so called 
‘one-punch’ assaults and that for example have bedevilled s 23(1)(b) of 
the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) which states that a person is not 
criminally responsible for an event that occurs by accident.53 The 
Queensland Law Reform Commission recently reported on the 
                                                           
46  Ibid. 
47  Reniger v Feogossa (1551) 1 Plowden 19, 31. ‘If a person that is drunk kills 
another, this shall be felony, and he shall be hanged for it, and yet he did it 
through ignorance, for when he was drunk he had no understanding nor memory: 
but inasmuch as that ignorance was occasioned by his own act and folly, and he 
might have avoided it, he shall not be privileged thereby.’ 
48  The Ethics of Aristotle; The Nicomachean Ethics (Thompson, 1976) 383. 
49  E Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England (Book 1, 1628) 247. 
50  For a discussion of this issue see Julia Tolmie, ‘Alcoholism and Criminal Liability’ 
(2001) 64(5) Modern Law Review 688. 
51  S.C. Small v Noa Kurimalawai, Australian Capital Territory Magistrates’ Court, 
CC97/01904 (22 October 1997) 11; See Parliament of Victoria Law Reform 
Committee, above n 38, 4-5. 
52  Standing Committee on Justice and Community Safety, Legislative Assembly for 
the Australian Capital Territory, The Crimes (Amendment) Bill No 4 1998, 
Report No 10, (May 2000) 1.3. 
53  The equivalent section in the Criminal Code 1902 (WA) is s 23B(2). 
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excuse of accident,54 which followed an audit55 of the defences to 
homicide used in murder and manslaughter in Queensland in the 
previous five years and public outrage over several high profile cases 
in which the defendants were acquitted or convicted of lesser charges. 
The main difficulty with the alternative subjective approach (to the 
‘absolutist’ position), which treats the defendant’s actual state of mind 
at the time of the alleged offence as the sole determinant of guilt, is 
that such an approach treats as irrelevant what the defendant’s state of 
mind would have been had the defendant been sober. Thus, a strictly 
subjective approach to intoxication and criminal responsibility would, 
as the Law Commission acknowledged, ‘have the effect of providing 
the defendant with a complete answer to any serious offence requiring 
proof of a culpable state of mind’.56 This then led the Law 
Commission to observe that the ‘absolutist’ approach and the purely 
subjective approach were equally unattractive resulting in English law 
adopting an intermediate position based on the definitional 
requirements of the offence.57 
This paper contends that given the Law Commission of England and 
Wales accepted that ‘there is a compelling argument for imposing 
criminal liability’ to the extent reflected by the culpability associated 
with knowingly and voluntarily becoming intoxicated which the Law 
Commission stated was ‘morally justifiable in principle, and warranted 
by the desirability of ensuring public safety and deterring harmful 
conduct’,58 it is unfortunate the Law Commission was unable to shed 
its Majewski driven view of the interaction between intoxication and 
criminal responsibility. It is here argued that Lord Denning pointed 
the correct way forward in Attorney-General of Northern Ireland v 
Gallagher:59 
I think the law on this point should take a clear stand. If a man, whilst 
sane and sober, forms an intention to kill and makes preparation for it, 
knowing it is a wrong thing to do, and then gets himself drunk so as to 
give himself Dutch courage to do the killing, and whilst drunk carries out 
                                                           
54  Queensland Law Reform Commission, A review of the excuse of accident and the 
defence of provocation, Report No 64 (2008). 
55  Department of Justice and Attorney-General, Queensland Government, Audit on 
Defences to Homicide: Accident and Provocation, Discussion Paper (2007). 
56  See Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 43, 1.53. 
57  Ibid, 1.58. Andrew Ashworth appears to agree with this position. ‘Murder and 
wounding with intent are crimes of specific intent, and there is no great loss of 
social defence in allowing intoxication to negative the intent required for those 
crimes when the amplitude of the basic intent offences of manslaughter and 
unlawful wounding lies beneath them — ensuring D’s conviction and liability for 
sentence.’ Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2006) 212. 
58  Ibid, 1.55. 
59  [1963] AC 349, 382-383. 
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his intention, he cannot rely on this self-induced drunkenness as a defence 
to a charge of murder, nor even as reducing it to manslaughter. He cannot 
say that he got himself into such a stupid state that he was incapable of  an 
intent to kill … I would agree, of course, that if before the killing he had 
discarded his intention to kill or reversed it—and then got drunk—it 
would be a different matter. 
The difficulty with the ‘Dutch courage’ scenario is that only the 
defendant would ever know whether he or she had formed a prior 
intention to kill or had then discarded such an intention and woken 
up from a drunken stupor to find the intended victim dead anyway. 
Nevertheless, some jurisdictions specifically exclude evidence of 
intoxication if the person ‘had resolved before becoming intoxicated 
to do the relevant conduct or became intoxicated in order to 
strengthen his or her resolve to do the relevant conduct’.60 However, 
Lord Denning was trying to address the important issue of the 
knowledge from past experience that people have of the effect of 
alcohol (or drugs) on their own behaviour. The Majewski public 
policy perspective is that getting intoxicated is reckless and therefore a 
person should be held criminally responsible for any crime committed 
whilst intoxicated where recklessness is the requisite fault element. 
The reasoning in Majewski was that no wrong is done to a person in 
holding him or her criminally responsible for any injuries inflicted 
upon others whilst intoxicated precisely because the act of 
intoxication supplies the evidence of mens rea, at least for crimes of 
basic intent. However, the better view is that because a person 
voluntarily becomes potentially dangerous through the ingestion of 
alcohol or drugs in wanton disregard of public safety, this voluntary 
act becomes the moral equivalent of possessing the fault element of 
recklessness as regards other people’s safety. 
One of the main criticisms of the Majewski approach is the problem 
of distinguishing between offences of specific and basic intent.61 This 
is reinforced where a defendant is charged with offences of both 
specific and basic intent and intoxication is an issue, thereby requiring 
the judge to give different directions to the jury on the relevance of 
intoxication which may be confusing and submerge the jury in 
technical legal rules.62 A further criticism is that for offences of basic 
                                                           
60  Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 428C(2); See also Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 28(2); 
Criminal Code 1913 (WA) s 28(2). Such prior resolution amounts to constructive 
mens rea. This is a sound policy position and is preferable to the argument 
supporting admission of evidence of intoxication on the grounds it may be 
counter-productive to the defence if the jury accepts the intoxicated defendant’s 
inhibitions and self-control were thereby reduced.  
61  See for example The Queen v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64, 81 (Barwick CJ): 
‘With great respect to those who have favoured this classification of crimes, it is to 
my mind not only inappropriate but it obscures more than it reveals.’ 
62  See Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee, above n 38, 80. 
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intent the jury is forced to consider how a defendant would have acted 
had he or she been sober, a task that has been described as ‘impossible 
and artificial’.63 The attack on the ‘fiction’ that the defendant was 
sober is exemplified by the following submission to the Parliament of 
Victoria Law Reform Committee: 
[T]he voluntariness of any act would be assessed on the fictional basis 
that the accused was sober, and hence it would be presumed that the 
accused acted voluntarily, and further it would be presumed that the 
accused was sober for the purpose of determining fault in relation to 
crimes of basic intent but not for crimes of specific intent.64 
Whilst this paper acknowledges the technical force of such a criticism, 
as discussed earlier, s 43AF(5) Criminal Code 1983 (NT) avoids any 
‘fiction’ as to the voluntariness of any act by preventing evidence of 
self-induced intoxication being considered. The preferred position in 
this paper is to overcome the ‘fiction’ of sobriety regarding the fault 
element for crimes of basic intent by contending that evidence of 
intoxication should be inadmissible for any offence. Nevertheless, if 
intoxication evidence is to be admitted for specified offences, this 
paper addresses the ‘fiction’ of the sober defendant by substituting an 
objective test of the sober reasonable person. The test becomes what 
the ordinary responsible sober person would in all the circumstances 
have considered to be the natural and probable outcome. 
C Majewski Writ Small 
The rule in Majewski is that if the Crown can prove the defendant 
committed the external element of an offence with a fault element of 
recklessness whilst intoxicated, liability can be sheeted home despite 
the defendant’s lack of appreciation of the relevant risk, provided the 
Crown can prove that the defendant would have appreciated that risk 
if he or she had been sober. In effect, the rule in Majewski allows the 
Crown to pursue an alternative objective basis to establish liability by 
qualifying the normal subjective approach for offences requiring no 
more than recklessness as the fault element. Consistent with the 
presumption of innocence, if it is reasonably possible that the 
defendant would have been unaware of the relevant risk even if sober 
or that a sober person might have made the same mistake, then the 
defendant is not liable for the offence. However, as mentioned earlier, 
Majewski is of limited use in determining the intoxication provisions 
of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) as the Guide for Practitioners makes 
clear: 
The physical elements of an offence are conduct, circumstances or results. 
The Code provisions on intoxication require a distinction to be drawn 
                                                           
63  Ibid, 81, citing a submission from the Victorian Criminal Bar Association. 
64  Ibid, citing a submission from the Attorney-General’s Department, South 
Australia. 
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between conduct elements of an offence and circumstantial or result 
elements.65 When evidence of intoxication would have a rational bearing 
on proof of intention, knowledge, recklessness, negligence or any other 
fault element relating to an incriminating circumstance or result of 
conduct, the court must give consideration to that evidence.66 
Leader-Elliott has identified in a table in a recent article that for the 
physical element of conduct, the fault element is intention; for the 
physical element of circumstance, the fault element is knowledge; and 
for the physical element of result, the fault element is recklessness or 
negligence, or others as specified.67 This paper contends that 
recklessness should be the dividing line for a general rule regarding 
the admissibility of self-induced intoxication evidence, which would 
limit such evidence to proof of intention or knowledge.  
The Guide for Practitioners continues with a discussion that 
intoxication can lend credibility to a defendant’s denial of intention, 
knowledge or recklessness because drunks are poorly co-ordinated, 
display bad judgment and make mistakes. Therefore, the argument 
runs, ‘[d]epending on the circumstances, these decrements in 
performance can displace the usual inference that anyone of normal 
intelligence must have known what they were doing or must have 
intended the consequences of their actions: s 9.1(2)’.  
Section 9.1(2) Criminal Code 1995 (Cth)68 deals with mistake or 
ignorance of fact for fault elements other than negligence and allows 
the jury to consider whether the mistake was reasonable in the 
circumstances.69 Odgers states that s 9.1(2) is ‘superfluous’ as the jury, 
in determining whether the defendant entertained a mistaken belief 
about some fact that negated a fault element, ‘would inevitably 
consider the reasonableness of making such a mistake’70 under the 
circumstances. Odgers goes on to make the following pertinent 
observation as regards the nature of the test. 
                                                           
65  See the note to Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) s 8(2) and the note to Criminal Code 
1983 (NT) s 43AS(1).  
66  See Leader-Elliott, above n 18, 145 (original emphasis). The Guide for 
Practitioners at 149 makes the point that a defendant who claims that the act 
causing harm was a mere stumble can equally well deny that there was any 
intention to cause harm. ‘The same conclusion follows for all offences which 
require proof of fault with respect to a result. If the act causing the result was not 
intentional, the result is not intentional either.’ 
67  Ian Leader-Elliott, ‘The Australian Criminal Code: Time for Some Changes’ 
(2009) 37(2) Federal Law Review 205, 212-213. 
68  See also Criminal Code 1983 (NT) s 43AW(2). 
69  Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) s 9.1(2) states: ‘In determining whether a person was 
under a mistaken belief about, or was ignorant of, facts, the tribunal of fact may 
consider whether the mistaken belief or ignorance was reasonable in the 
circumstances.’ 
70  See Odgers, above n 19, 78. 
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What this provision does not do is replace a subjective test with an 
objective one. While the reasonableness of the mistake is relevant in 
deciding whether the defendant might have made it, the ultimate issue is 
whether the defendant might have made it, not whether the mistake was a 
reasonable one.71 
On the question of proof, Odgers points out that while there is an 
evidential burden on a defendant who relies on mistake of fact, this is 
of ‘no practical significance because there is no evidential burden on 
the defendant who argues that the prosecution has failed to prove an 
element of the offence’.72 The prosecution must prove every element 
of an offence and there is no evidential burden on a defendant who 
argues mistake of fact prevents a fault element being proven. 
This paper takes issue with the present legislation as it is contended 
that if the defence is going to argue intoxication displaced the 
inference that a normal person intended the consequences of his or 
her actions, then the ‘superfluous’ s 9.1(2) above needs to go further 
than simply allowing the jury to consider the reasonableness of the 
mistake as regards negating a fault element from the subjective 
perspective of the defendant. The test should become objective by 
requiring consideration of whether the mistake was a reasonable one 
and not whether the defendant might have made the mistake.  
The above contention derives some support from the position taken 
by the Law Commission of England and Wales who recommended 
that: 
[A] defendant should not be able to rely on mistake of fact arising from 
self-induced intoxication in support of a defence to which the defendant’s 
state of mind is relevant, regardless of the nature of the fault alleged. The 
defendant’s mistaken belief should be taken into account only if the 
defendant would have held the same belief if the defendant had not been 
intoxicated.73 
The Law Commission has adopted a subjective test of the defendant’s 
belief rather than the preferred objective test of a sober reasonable 
defendant, but at least requires the mistaken belief to be assessed from 
the perspective of a sober defendant. The Law Commission used the 
example of self-defence not being available if the mistake the 
defendant made as to the circumstances was caused by intoxication 
citing Lord Lane CJ for the Court of Appeal in O’Grady74 as 
authority: 
                                                           
71  Ibid (original emphasis). 
72  Ibid. 
73  See Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 43, 3.53. 
74  O’Grady [1987] QB 995. 
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[W]here the jury are satisfied that the defendant was mistaken in his belief 
that any force or the force which he in fact used was necessary to defend 
himself and are further satisfied that the mistake was caused by 
voluntarily induced intoxication, the defence [of self defence] must fail. 
We do not consider that any distinction should be drawn on this aspect of 
the matter between offences involving what is called specific intent, such 
as murder, and offences of so-called basic intent, such as manslaughter. 
Quite apart from the problem of directing a jury in a case such as the 
present where manslaughter is an alternative verdict to murder,75 the 
question of mistake can and ought to be considered separately from the 
question of intent.76 
The use of a sober defendant, albeit subjective and fictional, is a 
considerable improvement on the present intoxication provisions in 
the Commonwealth and Northern Territory Criminal Codes where 
the standard of a reasonable person who is not intoxicated only 
emerges where intoxication may be relevant to defences such as self-
defence and the defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency, which 
is discussed in a later section of this paper. 
Such a critical view of the present legislation becomes more apparent 
when the content of s 8.2(4) Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) is 
considered.77 Section 8.2(4) operates as an exception to evidence of 
self-induced intoxication being excluded in determining whether a 
fault element of basic intent existed, and allows such evidence to be 
taken into consideration in deciding whether a person had a mistaken 
belief about facts if the person had considered whether or not the 
facts existed. As Odgers notes while this exception only applies if the 
person has given consideration as to the existence of the facts, ‘it is a 
limitation of little practical significance’ because ‘[i]f a person has a 
belief about facts, he or she has invariably considered, to some extent, 
whether or not the facts exist’.78 
The Guide for Practitioners states that s 8.2(4) ‘has no bearing on 
proof of basic intent’ as the provision applies ‘only to the defence of 
reasonable mistake of fact in offences which impose strict liability’.79 
The mistake has to be reasonable by virtue of s 8.2(5)(b) which uses 
the words ‘honestly and reasonably believed’. The Guide for 
Practitioners comments that the prosecution can ‘rely on evidence of 
the defendant’s intoxication to defeat the defence … by proving the 
mistake to have been unreasonable’.80 This paper contends that if 
intoxication is being used to support a defence of reasonable mistake 
                                                           
75  See for example Criminal Code 1983 (NT) s 316(1).  
76  O’Grady [1987] QB 995, 999. 
77  See also Criminal Code 1983 (NT) s 43AS(3). 
78  See Odgers, above n 19, 72. 
79  See Leader-Elliott, above n 18, 153. 
80  Ibid. 
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of fact, then, even for an offence of strict liability, the defendant’s 
mistaken belief should be taken account only if a reasonable sober 
person would have held the same belief (or at a minimum only if the 
defendant would have held the same belief if the defendant had not 
been intoxicated). 
Furthermore, s 8.2(4) needs to be considered in tandem with the 
‘sister’ exception of accident in s 8.2(3)81 which allows evidence of 
self-induced intoxication to be taken into consideration in 
determining whether conduct was accidental. The Guide for 
Practitioners observes a claim that conduct was accidental ‘is no more 
than a denial that the conduct was intended’.82 There is therefore a 
distinction between a denial of intention based on mistake (not 
permitted) and a denial of intention based on accident (permitted), 
albeit a ‘fine’83 distinction. The Guide for Practitioners optimistically 
opines that the accident exception to the rule excluding reliance on 
evidence of intoxication ‘is likely to be narrowly construed’.84 Rather, 
the author respectfully agrees with Odgers who concluded that the 
exceptions in ss 8.2(3) and (4) ‘to a large extent remove the 
prohibition created by the rule’.85 
Odgers reinforces the weakness of the prohibition by noting that 
because the prohibition is restricted to whether the defendant 
intended to engage in particular conduct (s 8.2(2)), ‘it follows that 
evidence of self-induced intoxication … may be considered in 
determining whether a fault element of intention existed in relation to 
a physical element of circumstance or a physical element of result’.86 
In R v Collins,87 Weinberg J was considering the equivalent section, s 
31(1) Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), in relation to manslaughter which 
his Honour stated had three physical elements: an act or omission; 
causing death; that is unlawful. Justice Weinberg noted that the first 
element constituted conduct, the second the result of conduct, and 
the third as a circumstance in which conduct, or a result of conduct, 
happens. His Honour concluded that ‘s 31(1) would appear to apply 
to the fault element for the acts or omissions, but not to any fault 
elements of the other two physical elements’.88 
                                                           
81  See also Criminal Code 1983 (NT) s 43AS(2).  
82  See Leader-Elliott, above n 18, 151. 
83  Ibid. 
84  Ibid. 
85  See Odgers, above n 19, 70-71. 
86  Ibid 71. 
87  R v Collins [2004] ACTSC 108 (18 June 2004) (Weinberg J). 
88  Ibid [83]-[84]. 
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D General Rule of ‘Recklessness’ Governing the Admissibility of 
Intoxication Evidence 
This then begs the question as to the nature of the general rule 
governing the admissibility of intoxication evidence. A very useful 
starting point is the recommendation of the Law Commission of 
England and Wales which argued there should be a general rule that: 
(1) if the defendant is charged with having committed an offence as a 
perpetrator; 
(2) the fault element of the offence is not an integral fault element (for 
example, because it merely requires proof of recklessness); and 
(3) the defendant was voluntarily intoxicated at the material time. 
Then, in determining whether or not the defendant is liable for the 
offence, the defendant should be treated as having been aware of anything 
which the defendant would then have been aware of but for the 
intoxication.89 
The Law Commission adopted recklessness (both subjective 
recklessness and objective ‘Caldwell’90 recklessness) as the touchstone 
for disregarding the effects of self-induced intoxication.91 The Law 
Commission identified the following integral fault elements as 
exceptions to the above general rule and therefore should always have 
to be proved: intention as to a consequence (but not intention as to 
conduct); knowledge as to something (but not knowledge as to a risk 
which falls within the scope of subjective recklessness); belief as to 
something (this is a belief amounting to a certainty or near-certainty); 
fraud; and dishonesty.92 
If the sufficiency of proof of the fault element of recklessness was to 
become the sole criterion for the admissibility or otherwise of evidence of 
self induced intoxication, then this would bring s 43AK Recklessness of 
the Criminal Code 1983 (NT) fully into play. Section 43AK uses the term 
awareness of a substantial risk that a result will happen or that the 
circumstance will exist, and that having regard to the circumstances 
known to the person, it is unjustifiable to take the risk. Applying the 
above integral fault elements as exceptions to the general rule of 
                                                           
89  See Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 43, 3.35. 
90  Following Caldwell [1982] AC 341, the defendant is Caldwell reckless if the 
defendant is subjectively reckless or if the defendant does not foresee the relevant 
risk but a reasonable person would have foreseen it. 
91  See also United States Model Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft, American Law 
Institute (1962) s 2.08(2): ‘When recklessness establishes an element of an offense, 
if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he 
would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.’ 
92  See Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 43, 3.46. 
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recklessness, because knowledge as to a risk is deemed to fall within the 
scope of subjective recklessness, evidence of self-induced intoxication 
would be completely precluded for manslaughter (an offence of basic 
intent) under s 160 Criminal Code 1983 (NT) as recklessness or 
negligence are alternative faults elements. 
This paper takes such an argument one step further. The leading case on 
reckless murder at common law in Australia is R v Crabbe93 where the 
test is whether the accused knew that death was a probable as opposed to 
possible consequence of his or her conduct. Clearly, a ‘substantial risk’ in 
s 43AK is equivalent to the test applied for reckless murder at common 
law. It follows that as reckless murder would therefore be open to the 
exclusion of intoxication evidence if recklessness was the sole criterion of 
the admissibility of self-induced intoxication, there is little point in 
preserving the specific intent versus basic intent division.  
Alternatively, if intoxication evidence is to be allowed, where the defence 
raises intoxication evidence, this paper advocates the replacement of a 
subjective test with an objective test for criminal responsibility as was 
held by the House of Lords in DPP v Smith94 until replaced by statute.95 
In Smith, a policeman tried to prevent the defendant from driving off with 
stolen goods by jumping on the bonnet of the car. The defendant not only 
drove away at speed but also succeeded in dislodging the police officer 
by zigzagging. The policeman fell into the path of an oncoming vehicle 
and was killed. The trial judge directed the jury on the basis of whether a 
reasonable man would have contemplated that grievous bodily harm was 
likely to result to the police officer. The Court of Appeal quashed the 
murder conviction and substituted a manslaughter conviction in applying 
a subjective test.96 The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed to the 
House of Lords who reinstated the murder conviction in holding that the 
trial judge had not misdirected the jury and that an objective test was 
applicable. 
                                                           
93  R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464. 
94  [1961] AC 290. 
95  Criminal Justice Act 1967 (UK), s 8 provides that the court: ‘(a) shall not be bound 
in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of 
its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions; but (b) shall decide 
whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, 
drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances.’ 
The decision in DPP v Smith was treated as wrongly decided by the Privy Council 
in Frankland v R [1987] AC 576. 
96  The test put forward by Byrne J stated: ‘While that is an inference [a person 
intends the natural consequences of his or her acts] which may be drawn, and on 
the facts in certain circumstances must inevitably be drawn, yea if on all the facts 
of a particular case it is not the correct inference, then it should not be drawn.’ 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1961] AC 290, 300.                   
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Viscount Kilmuir LC gave the sole speech: 
The jury must, of course, in such a case as the present make up their 
minds on the evidence whether the accused was unlawfully and 
voluntarily doing something to someone. The unlawful and voluntary act 
must clearly be aimed at someone in order to eliminate cases of 
negligence or of careless or dangerous driving. Once, however, the jury 
are satisfied as to that, it matters not what the accused in fact 
contemplated as the probable result or whether he ever contemplated at 
all, provided he was in law responsible and accountable for his actions, 
that is, was a man capable of forming an intent, not insane within the 
M'Naghten Rules and not suffering from diminished responsibility. On 
the assumption that he is so accountable for his actions, the sole question 
is whether the unlawful and voluntary act was of such a kind that grievous 
bodily harm was the natural and probable result. The only test available 
for this is what the ordinary responsible man would, in all the 
circumstances of the case, have contemplated as the natural and probable 
result.97 
If the facts in Smith were to be applied to the Northern Territory, 
then the Crown would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the 
elements of s 156 above, and s 156(1)(c) in particular which is a 
subjective test. However, if an intoxicated driver is introduced into 
the factual scenario and the defence seeks to rely on intoxication as 
the reason why the defendant did not form the necessary intention to 
cause the death of or serious harm to the victim, then this paper 
contends that it is appropriate to go beyond an evidential onus with 
the low bar of ‘a reasonable possibility’,98 and to place a legal burden 
on the defendant to prove on the balance of probabilities that he or 
she did not foresee or intend the natural and probable consequences 
of his or her conduct. This does not place an ‘insuperable burden on a 
defendant’99 and is consistent with Murphy J’s reference to a 
rebuttable presumption in O’Connor v The Queen.100  
                                                           
97  Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1961] AC 290, 327, concurred in by Lord 
Goddard, Lord Tucker, Lord Denning and Lord Parker of Waddington. The 
decision in Smith harked back to R v Meade [1909] 1 KB 895. 
98  See Criminal Code 1983 (NT) s 43BT Evidential burden of proof. 
99  See Robert Hawke cited in Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee, 
Criminal Liability for Self-Induced Intoxication, above n 26. 
100  (1980) 146 CLR 64, 116. The rebuttable presumption does not change the role of 
intoxication from an excuse that seeks to negative intent to a situation where intent 
is removed from the jury altogether. The jury is not directed that public policy 
grounds override any doubts they may have concerning the intoxicated defendant’s 
intention. Rather, the jury is told it must consider whether the defence has 
satisfied them on the balance of probabilities that the defendant when sober did 
not intend the natural and probable consequences of his or her conduct. Such a 
direction is consistent with Murphy J’s observation in O’Connor that ‘in the 
absence of other evidence, this is the only reasonable inference open to them in 
most criminal cases’. 
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More realistically, in the Northern Territory, the Crown would 
prosecute a Smith case under s 174F for driving a motor vehicle 
causing death or serious harm which under s 174F(4) is an offence of 
strict liability101 and which carries a maximum term of imprisonment 
of 10 years under s 174F(1). For present purposes it is of interest that 
one of the physical elements of the offence is driving dangerously, 
which in turn has three alternative definitions one of which is being 
under the influence of alcohol to such an extent as to be incapable of 
having proper control of the vehicle. Thus, not only is this serious 
offence one of strict liability but also intoxication per se is sufficient to 
trigger a physical element.  
However, as one academic author has pointed out there have been 
suggestions that ‘voluntary intoxication will never support a defence 
to an offence of strict liability or negligence, for in such a case no 
mens rea, intention of foresight need be proved’.102 Orchard argues 
that this statement must be qualified as ‘on the majority view in 
O’Connor voluntary intoxication should excuse any offence if it led to 
the relevant conduct being “involuntary”, because voluntary conduct 
is essential for criminal responsibility even when strict liability is 
imposed’.103 As has been previously discussed, this point is met by s 
43AF(5) Criminal Code 1983 (NT) which prevents evidence of self-
induced intoxication being considered in determining whether 
conduct was voluntary. Therefore, if a serious offence such as s 174F 
above can be legislated to be an offence of strict liability and s 
43AF(5) disposes of voluntariness as an issue, then this begs the 
question as to whether it is such a big stretch to declare evidence of 
intoxication inadmissible for all offences that contain a fault element?  
Indeed, one could turn around the arguments of the proponents of 
O’Connor who suggest that evidence of self-induced intoxication is 
rarely accepted by the jury, by contending that if the jury rarely 
believes the defendant is there any reason for stopping at recklessness 
as the touchstone for basic intent and not taking the ‘absolutist’ 
position? 
Given that in an adversarial legal system trial by jury is widely 
portrayed as a bastion against arbitrary exercise of power by the state, 
the significance of comments, warnings and directions to the jury 
should not be underestimated.104 ‘While doubts are often expressed 
                                                           
101  Under s 43AN strict liability is defined as where there are no fault elements for 
any of the physical elements and the defence of mistake of fact under s 43AX is 
available. 
102  Orchard, ‘Criminal Responsibility and Intoxication — The Australian Rejection of 
Majewski’, above n 3, citing C R Williams, An Annual Survey of Law (1976) 88. 
103  Ibid, 537 (original emphasis). 
104 See for example, Australian Law Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, 
Report No 102 (2005) [18.4]. 
Banishing Evidence of Intoxication 25 
 
 
about whether juries understand and heed judicial directions, the law 
operates on the assumption that they do.’105 The Australian Law 
Reform Commission noted that studies showed that juror 
comprehension varied according to the subject matter of the 
direction,106 and that ‘[d]irections regarding subject matter which is 
new, difficult or counter-intuitive to jurors’ commonsense are less 
likely to be effective than directions regarding subject matter with 
which jurors are generally familiar’.107  
Although jurors are generally familiar with the effects of intoxication, 
‘a number of studies have shown that directions to disregard 
inadmissible evidence or to limit the use of evidence are less likely to 
be effective than other types of directions, and can in fact be counter-
productive’.108 This finding is significant where jurors are required to 
distinguish between the admissibility of evidence of intoxication for 
different offences where alternative verdicts are available such as 
murder (specific intent) and manslaughter (basic intent), or different 
charges within the same sequence of events such as serious harm 
(specific intent) and assault (basic intent). Furthermore, empirical 
research has confirmed the finding ‘that jurors have difficulties 
understanding and following judicial directions’.109 This paper 
contends such practical considerations are persuasive reasons for 
adopting the ‘absolutist’ position. 
IV RECONSTRUCTING INTOXICATION IN PART IIAA 
CRIMINAL CODE (NT) 
The intoxication of anger, like that of the grape, shows us to others, but 
hides us from ourselves.110 
In keeping with the three levels on which this paper has addressed the 
important question of intoxication and criminal responsibility, the 
relevant sections of Part IIAA Criminal Code 1983 (NT) are here 
rewritten to reflect each level, starting with the preferred position that 
                                                           
105 Ibid [18.8], citing R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592. 
106  Ibid [18.10], citing J Tanford, ‘The Law and Psychology of Jury Instruction’ 
(1990) 69 Nebraska Law Review 71, 79. 
107  Ibid [18.10] 79-80. 
108  Ibid [18.12] 86-87; J Lieberman and J Arndt, ‘Understanding the Limits of 
Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of 
Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence’ 
(2000) 6 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 677, 703. 
109 Ibid [18.14], citing New Zealand Law Commission, Juries in Criminal Trials, 
Preliminary Paper 37 Vol 2 (1999); W Young, Y Tinsley and N Cameron, ‘The 
Effectiveness and Efficiency of Jury Decision-Making’ (2000) 24 Criminal Law 
Journal 89, 100. 
110  John Dryden. 
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evidence of intoxication be inadmissible for any offence. The simplest 
and most clear cut approach to achieve this objective would be to 
rewrite s 43AS as follows: 
Section 43AS Intoxication 
Evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered in determining 
whether a fault element of specific intent or of basic intent existed. 
(Words in italics added and the rest of s 43AS deleted.) 
In the alternative, the second level of analysis has considered the 
admissibility of evidence of intoxication from the perspective of 
changing the onus of proof from an evidentiary burden to a legal 
burden on the defence. Currently, s 43BV Criminal Code 1983 (NT) 
deals with the legal burden of proof on the defence, and relevantly 
states that a legal burden on the defence is only imposed if the law 
expressly specifies the burden is a legal burden, or requires the 
defendant to prove the matter, or creates a presumption that the 
matter exists unless the contrary is proved. Adopting the latter 
presumption, a new subsection would be inserted into s 43AS, which 
is labelled s 43AS(6) in the proposed complete revision of s 43AS 
given below. 
Subsection 43AS(6) 
Where evidence of self-induced intoxication is admitted under one of the 
specified fault elements operating as an exception to the general rule that 
a defendant should be treated as having been aware of anything which the 
defendant would then have been aware of but for the intoxication, the 
intoxicated person is presumed to have foreseen or intended the natural 
and probable consequences of his or her conduct unless the contrary is 
proved. 
Consistent with the proposed new subsection 43AS(6) above and with 
the objective test of a reasonable sober person for the purpose of 
mistaken belief of fact for an offence of strict liability identified earlier 
in this paper, a new section would be added to s 43AX Mistake of fact 
— strict liability,111 which is similar in form to s 43AU(3)112 which 
deals with the relevance of intoxication to defences such as the 
defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency. 
Section 43AX(3) 
If any part of an excuse of mistaken belief as to the existence of facts is 
based on reasonable belief, in determining whether that reasonable belief 
existed, regard must be had to the standard of a reasonable person who is 
not intoxicated. 
                                                           
111  See also Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) s 9.2. 
112  See also Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) s 8.4(2). 
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The third level of analysis, which is not mutually exclusive with a legal 
burden of proof on the defence in the proposed new subsection for s 
43AS above, is to rectify the restricted definition of basic intent in 
Part IIAA, and to specify the fault elements that operate as exceptions 
to the general rule that, where the fault element of recklessness 
satisfies the fault element for an offence, evidence of self-induced 
intoxication cannot be considered. Presently, s 43AS Criminal Code 
1983 (NT) reads as follows: 
43AS Intoxication – offences involving basic intent  
(1) Evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered in 
determining whether a fault element of basic intent existed.113 
Note for subsection (1)  
A fault element of intention in relation to a result or circumstance is not a 
fault element of basic intent. 
(2) This section does not prevent evidence of self-induced intoxication 
being taken into consideration in determining whether conduct was 
accidental.  
(3) This section does not prevent evidence of self-induced intoxication 
being taken into consideration in determining whether a person had a 
mistaken belief about facts if the person had considered whether or not the 
facts existed.  
(4) A person may be regarded as having considered whether or not facts 
existed if:  
(a) he or she had considered, on a previous occasion, whether those facts 
existed in circumstances surrounding that occasion; and  
(b) he or she honestly and reasonably believed that the circumstances 
surrounding the present occasion were the same, or substantially the same, 
as those surrounding the previous occasion. 
This paper has contended that the note for subsection (1) above and 
the two exceptions of accident and mistake of fact in subsections (2) 
and (3) respectively, have the effect of leaving the prohibition in s 
43AS(1) with very little work to do. The proposed revision of s 43AS 
below takes as its starting point the language of the general rule 
advocated by the Law Commission of England and Wales suitably 
adjusted for the nomenclature of Part IIAA Criminal Code 1983 
(NT). The list of specific intent offences in the proposed s 43AS(5) 
below is restricted to three offences because at present Part IIAA only 
applies to a narrow band of offences against the person listed in 
Schedule 1 of the Criminal Code 1983 (NT). The proposed new 
subsection 43AS(6) above dealing with a legal onus of proof on the 
defence is incorporated into the completely revised s 43AS below. 
 
                                                           
113  Section 43AS follows s 8.2 Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) but omits s 8.2(2) which 
states: ‘A fault element of basic intent is a fault element of intention for a physical 
element that consists only of conduct.’ 
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43AS Intoxication – offences involving basic intent  
(1) Evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered in 
determining whether a fault element of basic intent existed, and the person 
is to be treated as having been aware of anything which the person would 
then have been aware but for the intoxication. 
(2) A fault element of basic intent is defined as not being a fault element 
of specific intent in subsection (3), such as a fault element that requires 
proof of recklessness. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, a fault element of specific intent 
means an intention as to a result or circumstance (but not intention as to 
conduct)114 or knowledge as to something (but not knowledge as to a risk 
which falls within the scope of recklessness as defined in s 43AK of this 
Code) 115 
(4) However, evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered 
in determining whether a fault element of intoxication or knowledge 
existed if the person had resolved before becoming intoxicated to do the 
relevant conduct, or became intoxicated in order to strengthen his or her 
resolve to do the relevant conduct. 
(5) The only offences in Schedule 1 to which subsection (3) applies are: 
(a) Section 156 Murder 
(b) Section 162 Assisting and encouraging suicide 
(c) Section 176A Drink or food spiking. 
(6) Where evidence of self-induced intoxication is admitted under one of 
the specified fault elements operating as an exception to the general rule 
that a defendant should be treated as having been aware of anything which 
the defendant would then have been aware of but for the intoxication, the 
intoxicated person is presumed to have foreseen or intended the natural 
and probable consequences of his or her conduct unless the contrary is 
proved. 
Note for subsection (6)  
                                                           
114  This follows the language of s AI Intention where a person has intention in 
relation to conduct if the person means to engage in that conduct; a person has 
intention in relation to a result if the person means to bring it about or is aware it 
will happen in the ordinary course of events; and a person has intention in relation 
to a circumstance if the person believes that it exists or will exist. Thus, using the 
example of shoplifting, an offence requiring proof of ulterior intention, ‘the 
shoplifter cannot rely on evidence of intoxication to support a denial of intention 
to appropriate the publication [but] that evidence can be considered, however, 
when the court comes to consider whether the publication was appropriated with 
intent to deprive permanently’. See  Leader-Elliott, above n 18, 149-151 (original 
emphasis). 
115  Section AJ Knowledge states: ‘A person has knowledge of a result or circumstance 
if the person is aware that it exists or will exist in the ordinary course of events.’ 
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The presumption of foresight or intention of the natural and probable 
consequences of conduct applies only where evidence of intoxication is 
admitted and does not apply to any other defences. 
It is possible to illustrate the operation of the proposed s 43AS above 
by looking at two offences that are in Schedule 1 but are not listed as 
offences of specific intent in the proposed s 43AS(5) above. The first 
is s 192 Sexual intercourse without consent, and the second is s 240A 
Causing bushfires. Both of these offences specify the fault element of 
recklessness. Therefore, given the proposed s 43AS(3) above 
precludes evidence of intoxication being considered for a physical 
element where proof of recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the fault 
element, evidence of self-induced intoxication is inadmissible for both 
of these serious offences. 
V CONCLUSION 
Australians are not a nation of Snobs like the English, or of extravagant 
boasters like the Americans, or of reckless profligates like the French; 
they are simply a nation of Drunkards.116 
This paper has reviewed the law relating to the admissibility of 
evidence of self-induced intoxication in the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) 
and the Criminal Code 1983 (NT) and found it wanting. The attack 
on these two Codes has been made from two perspectives. The first is 
general and applies to a greater or lesser degree to all Australian 
jurisdictions: namely, that there is good reason of public policy to 
prevent the admissibility of evidence of self-induced intoxication for 
all offences, or, in the alternative, to place a legal burden on the 
defence to rebut the presumption that the intoxicated person foresaw 
or intended the natural and probable consequences of his or her 
conduct. The second is particular: namely, that these two Codes have 
the weakest and least effective version of the Majewski principle of all 
Australian jurisdictions such that the relevant basic intent provisions 
make the prohibition virtually meaningless. 
Consistent with these two perspectives, legislative change has been 
proposed which, at its highest, is the inverse of O’Connor such that 
evidence of intoxication is never part of the totality of the evidence. 
Such an approach avoids the difficulties associated with the division of 
offences into specific and basic intent by arguing that the Majewski 
measuring rod of recklessness should be extended to intention. This 
position is justified on public policy grounds that place primary 
importance on public safety, supported by evidence of a very 
significant statistical relationship between alcohol consumption and 
homicide in Australia. In effect, under this policy position, society is 
saying to every individual: ‘If you choose to get drunk then you must 
face the full consequences of all your actions.’ The clash between 
                                                           
116  Marcus Clarke, Humbug (15 September 1869). 
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principles of criminal liability and public policy has been neatly 
summed up one commentator who has observed that ‘the issue 
presents a choice of whether the magnitude of an offence should be 
measured from the objective perspective of the community or the 
subjective perspective of the offender’.117 This paper endorses the 
objective perspective. 
As an alternative to the preferred ‘absolutist’ position, a reversal in the 
onus of proof has been proposed where evidence of intoxication is led. 
It has here been contended that such a legal burden does not place an 
insuperable burden on the defendant, being on the balance of 
probabilities, and finds support in Canadian jurisprudence within the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Finally, and not mutually exclusive with a legal onus, revised 
provisions dealing with intoxication have been proposed for s 43AS 
Criminal Code 1983 (NT). The overriding objective of these 
redrafted provisions is to strengthen the reach of s 43AS, and to make 
these provisions the strongest and most effective version of the 
Majewski principle in Australia. 
It is to be hoped that the present shibboleth surrounding the 
reluctance of legislators to extend the Majewski principle to all 
offences, or to reverse the onus of proof where evidence of 
intoxication is led, will be revisited. The principle of criminal law that 
a person is not guilty unless the person acted voluntarily and 
intentionally should give way to the morally correct position that a 
person who is voluntarily intoxicated is criminally responsible for any 
conduct he or she causes whilst in such a condition. 
                                                           
117  M Keiter, ‘Just say no excuse: the rise and fall of the Intoxication Defence’ (1997) 
87 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 482. See Parliament of Victoria Law 
Reform Committee, above n 38, 6. 
